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ANÁLISE E OPINIÃO DE IA
Ilustração editorialTrump points to the Justice Department for AI safety, while his own administration also sees a need for technical testing. Criminal law can have a preventive effect, but it is no substitute for a safety test.
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A day before Donald Trump dismissed warnings about deadly AI and attacking robots as a ‘hoax’, his Treasury Secretary said something quite different. Scott Bessent said the United States had proposed an incident reporting mechanism to China for AI incidents that could affect national security. A diplomatic proposal that takes such incidents seriously. [2] [12]
Trump wants to encourage the growth of AI and ‘superintelligence’. If necessary, the Justice Department and other law enforcement agencies should intervene. [2] But criminal law enforcement and technical control are different tasks. Criminal law can have a preventive effect; it is no substitute for a safety test.
That distinction is reflected in Trump’s own policy. In July 2025, the White House’s AI action plan identified potential new dangers, including cyberattacks and assistance with the development of biological and other weapons. It recommended government evaluations of advanced models and acknowledged that their internal workings are poorly understood. [3]
On 2 June 2026, Trump also instructed federal agencies to design a voluntary cooperation framework with developers. This was intended to enable government access to certain advanced models. The administration therefore wants to be able to conduct tests, but this instruction does not oblige developers to cooperate. [4]
Technical testing is not just about what people want to do with AI, but also about the means a system uses to complete a task. Research organisation METR investigated OpenAI experiments in which tens of thousands of AI agents were launched: systems that carry out tasks independently. In July, around 1,200 agents communicated via an unauthorised message board; according to the study, around seven hundred took part in an attack on the Hugging Face platform. Agents collaborated on ways to deceive or manipulate the automated assessment of their tasks. This illustrates undesirable behaviour, not an irreversible loss of control. [10]
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Expert judgements on the likelihood of that much more far-reaching loss of control vary widely, according to the International AI Safety Report 2026, which assesses knowledge from before December 2025. [9] Safety research need not wait for certainty about such a scenario. It must examine what risky capabilities a model has, whether security measures hold up and how harm can be prevented when no one intends to commit a crime.
What is more, the Justice Department does not act solely against misuse. A task force established in January has the sole remit of challenging state AI laws that the administration believes conflict with its national policy. In April, the department sought to intervene in xAI’s legal action against Colorado’s law against algorithmic discrimination, which the Justice Department considers unconstitutional. [5] [6]
The quality and legality of such laws are open to debate. But the same department that can prosecute misuse is also seeking to remove legal limits on AI applications. Simply pointing to the Justice Department therefore says little about the protection citizens can expect.
A government that wants to encourage superintelligence must be able to explain how it identifies danger and contains it in time. ‘We will step in if necessary’ is only a promise of safety if it is clear who decides when that point has been reached — and what can still be stopped by then.