Producing more ammunition does not make stockpiles inexhaustible

On 15 September, Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell gave assurances that everything was available to strike at the time and place the president would choose. The White House spoke of more than enough ammunition for all the president’s strategic objectives and beyond. Neither statement contained verifiable stockpile figures. [4]

Parnell’s assurance is not necessarily at odds with concerns about shortages. In their analysis of the situation in April, Cancian and Park concluded that, under plausible scenarios, the United States had enough missiles to continue the war against Iran. But the alternative strike weapons available in greater quantities had a shorter range, exposing the aircraft or other platforms launching them to greater danger. Large-scale use required air superiority. Being able to keep attacking therefore does not in itself tell us under what conditions, or with what risks, this must be done. [5]

For land-attack cruise missiles, CBO saw relatively fewer constraints, thanks to larger initial stockpiles. However, continued consumption could limit their future deployment too. Not every category of weapon is under the same degree of pressure. [3]

More deliveries do not necessarily mean larger stockpiles

Set against this consumption is genuine industrial growth. RTX reported delivering three times as many Tomahawks in the first half of 2026 as in the same period in 2025. Lockheed Martin reported delivering 620 PAC-3 MSE interceptors in 2025, over twenty per cent more than a year earlier. These are reports of completed deliveries, not just announcements of future plans. [7] [8]

That growth deserves recognition. But the manufacturers’ figures do not specify what proportion went exclusively to replenishing US stockpiles and say nothing about the net balance after combat use and transfers. A factory can deliver substantially more while military stockpiles still fall. Growth figures for a few weapons over a few years also do not substantiate a historical record for total US ammunition production or stockpile build-up.

The duration of the new contracts shows why that distinction matters. A seven-year Tomahawk contract is intended to support an increase to more than a thousand missiles a year, for both the US Navy and allies. For PAC-3 MSE, a contract modification, also covering seven years, is intended, among other things, to enable a tripling of production capacity by the end of 2030. These are important steps, but capacity that has yet to be built is not sitting in a depot today. [7] [9]

CBO expected that restoring interceptor stockpiles would probably take at least five years, even with increased production. Scaling up can reduce the vulnerability; it does not erase the intervening years. [3]